Published Works
Djordjevic, C. Forthcoming a. "Affliction: Pain and the Problems of Modernity" in J. Manzi
(ed.) Between Wittgenstein and Weil: Comparisons in Philosophy, Religion, and Ethics.
Routledge Press
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Simone Weil share the conviction that the modern age is beset by illusions that make it difficult to accept or understand the human condition properly. One central one is how modernity attempts to make sense of pain, viewing it as antithetical to the human condition. This essay explores how each thinker responded to this illusion concerning pain. It argues that their respective accounts supplement and complement each other so that a devastating critique of modernity emerges, and a more human and humane way of understanding pain emerges. Section I adumbrates the modern conception of pain by reconstructing Scarry’s pivotal account of pain and the human condition. Section II utilizes Weil’s reflections on affliction to expose limitations in Scarry’s account and explore her transvaluation of pain by giving it a supernatural use. Section III begins to bring human uses of pain into view by demolishing the modernist conception of pain in the human condition. Finally, section IV proffers an analogy that algins human uses of pain with the supernatural uses of it. Should this analogy prove persuasive, we will have a radically different understanding of the role(s) of pain in human forms of life.
(ed.) Between Wittgenstein and Weil: Comparisons in Philosophy, Religion, and Ethics.
Routledge Press
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Simone Weil share the conviction that the modern age is beset by illusions that make it difficult to accept or understand the human condition properly. One central one is how modernity attempts to make sense of pain, viewing it as antithetical to the human condition. This essay explores how each thinker responded to this illusion concerning pain. It argues that their respective accounts supplement and complement each other so that a devastating critique of modernity emerges, and a more human and humane way of understanding pain emerges. Section I adumbrates the modern conception of pain by reconstructing Scarry’s pivotal account of pain and the human condition. Section II utilizes Weil’s reflections on affliction to expose limitations in Scarry’s account and explore her transvaluation of pain by giving it a supernatural use. Section III begins to bring human uses of pain into view by demolishing the modernist conception of pain in the human condition. Finally, section IV proffers an analogy that algins human uses of pain with the supernatural uses of it. Should this analogy prove persuasive, we will have a radically different understanding of the role(s) of pain in human forms of life.
Djordjevic, C. Forthcoming b. "Finding a Meaning for Pain: Definitions, Sense-Making, and
Philosophical Hermeneutics" Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
Pain has proven to be a refractory problem in US healthcare. This paper argues that starting to address this requires viewing pain-assessment as a form of sense-making that occurs between patients and providers. Section I argues that two standard definitions of “pain” that are thought to subtend pain assessment are not viable. Section II proffers a very different way to think about the meaning of “pain” and the nature of pain-assessment. Finally, section III develops this novel account in terms of a philosophical hermeneutics of sense-making. Should this prove persuasive, I will have shown an area in biomedicine where philosophy is not an ‘optional add on,’ but a vitally important part of what should be clinical practice.
Philosophical Hermeneutics" Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
Pain has proven to be a refractory problem in US healthcare. This paper argues that starting to address this requires viewing pain-assessment as a form of sense-making that occurs between patients and providers. Section I argues that two standard definitions of “pain” that are thought to subtend pain assessment are not viable. Section II proffers a very different way to think about the meaning of “pain” and the nature of pain-assessment. Finally, section III develops this novel account in terms of a philosophical hermeneutics of sense-making. Should this prove persuasive, I will have shown an area in biomedicine where philosophy is not an ‘optional add on,’ but a vitally important part of what should be clinical practice.
Djordjevic, C. Forthcoming c. "Pain Cannot (Just) be Whatever the Patient Says it is: A Critique of a
Dogma" Nursing Philosophy
Margo McCaffery’s definition of pain has proven to be one of the most consequential in nursing. She put forward this definition in response to the persistent undertreatment of pain. However, despite raising her definition to the status of a dogma, undertreatment remains a real problem. This essay explores the contention that McCaffery’s definition of pain elides critical aspects of it, aspects that demand consideration when treating pain. In section I, I set the stage. I discuss how McCaffery’s definition and her understanding of pain science interrelate. In section II, I raise three problems for this understanding. In section III, I argue that these problems stem from an incoherency in her definition. Finally, in section IV, I draw from hospice nursing as well as philosophy and the social sciences to redefine “pain” so that an intersubjective feature of it is foregrounded. I also discuss one implication this redefinition has for pain management
Dogma" Nursing Philosophy
Margo McCaffery’s definition of pain has proven to be one of the most consequential in nursing. She put forward this definition in response to the persistent undertreatment of pain. However, despite raising her definition to the status of a dogma, undertreatment remains a real problem. This essay explores the contention that McCaffery’s definition of pain elides critical aspects of it, aspects that demand consideration when treating pain. In section I, I set the stage. I discuss how McCaffery’s definition and her understanding of pain science interrelate. In section II, I raise three problems for this understanding. In section III, I argue that these problems stem from an incoherency in her definition. Finally, in section IV, I draw from hospice nursing as well as philosophy and the social sciences to redefine “pain” so that an intersubjective feature of it is foregrounded. I also discuss one implication this redefinition has for pain management
Djordjevic, C. 2023. "When, How, and Why Did “Pain” Become Subjective?" Philosophy of
Medicine Vol. 4(1): 1-22
The pain-assessment literature often claims that pain is subjective. However, the meaning and implications of this claim are left to the reader’s imagination. This paper attempts to make sense of the claim and its problems from the history and philosophy of science perspective. It examines the work of Henry Beecher, the first person to operationalize “pain” in terms of subjective measurements. First, I reconstruct Beecher’s operationalization of “pain.” Next, I argue this operationalization fails. Third, I salvage Beecher’s insights by repositioning them in an intersubjective account. Finally, I connect these insights to current pain-assessment approaches, showing that they enrich each other.
Medicine Vol. 4(1): 1-22
The pain-assessment literature often claims that pain is subjective. However, the meaning and implications of this claim are left to the reader’s imagination. This paper attempts to make sense of the claim and its problems from the history and philosophy of science perspective. It examines the work of Henry Beecher, the first person to operationalize “pain” in terms of subjective measurements. First, I reconstruct Beecher’s operationalization of “pain.” Next, I argue this operationalization fails. Third, I salvage Beecher’s insights by repositioning them in an intersubjective account. Finally, I connect these insights to current pain-assessment approaches, showing that they enrich each other.
Djordjevic, C. 2021a. "Be(com)ing a Christian is Not a Social Identity: Kierkegaard and the
Refusal of Social Roles" Religions– Special Issue: Kierkegaard's den Enkelte in an Era of "Identity
Politics" Vol 12 (6): 1-25
This paper examines aspects of Kierkegaard’s authorship in relation to contemporary identity politics. Specifically, it argues that several pseudonymous voices in Kierkegaard’s works and identity politics share the contention that ethics presupposes concrete practical identities to function. And given this, one conception of liberalism, predicated on procedural equality, is not viable. However, it also argues that other voices in Kierkegaard’s oeuvres press beyond identities and proffers a radically new way to make sense of differences and equality, one predicated on infinity. In section one, I clarify what this text means by “identity politics.” In section two, I adumbrate a model of practical rationality that partly captures how many voices in Kierkegaard’s works understand action and practical rationality. In section three, I turn to Judge William, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous ethical voice in Either/Or Part II. I argue that his understanding of the ethical sphere and identity politics align in some striking ways. In section four, I discuss the objections that several pseudonyms and Kierkegaard himself raise against Judge William’s and identity politics’ understanding of the self. Finally, in section five, I discuss the striking contention that infinity is the only way to harmonize equality and differences, a claim found in several voices within Kierkegaard’s oeuvres.
Refusal of Social Roles" Religions– Special Issue: Kierkegaard's den Enkelte in an Era of "Identity
Politics" Vol 12 (6): 1-25
This paper examines aspects of Kierkegaard’s authorship in relation to contemporary identity politics. Specifically, it argues that several pseudonymous voices in Kierkegaard’s works and identity politics share the contention that ethics presupposes concrete practical identities to function. And given this, one conception of liberalism, predicated on procedural equality, is not viable. However, it also argues that other voices in Kierkegaard’s oeuvres press beyond identities and proffers a radically new way to make sense of differences and equality, one predicated on infinity. In section one, I clarify what this text means by “identity politics.” In section two, I adumbrate a model of practical rationality that partly captures how many voices in Kierkegaard’s works understand action and practical rationality. In section three, I turn to Judge William, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous ethical voice in Either/Or Part II. I argue that his understanding of the ethical sphere and identity politics align in some striking ways. In section four, I discuss the objections that several pseudonyms and Kierkegaard himself raise against Judge William’s and identity politics’ understanding of the self. Finally, in section five, I discuss the striking contention that infinity is the only way to harmonize equality and differences, a claim found in several voices within Kierkegaard’s oeuvres.
Djordjevic, C. 2021b. "Thick Concepts in Economics: The Case of Becker and Murphy’s
Theory of Rational Addiction" Philosophy of the Social Sciences– Special Issues: European Network
for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol 51 (4): 371-399 (with C. Herfeld).
In this paper, we examine the viability of avoiding value judgments encoded in thick concepts when these concepts are used in economic theories. We focus on what implications this might have for the tenability of the fact/value dichotomy in economics. Thick concepts have an evaluative and a descriptive component. Our suggestion is that despite attempts to rid thick concepts of their evaluative component, economists are often not successful. We focus on the strategy of explication to remove the evaluative component of thick concepts and argue that often economists either have to make value judgments or are unable to individuate out the phenomenon under analysis. We support our claim with a case study, namely the concept of addiction in Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy’s Theory of Rational Addiction (1988). One consequence of our analysis is that theories containing thick concepts could commit the economists to making value judgments and as such undermine the fact/value dichotomy.
Theory of Rational Addiction" Philosophy of the Social Sciences– Special Issues: European Network
for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol 51 (4): 371-399 (with C. Herfeld).
In this paper, we examine the viability of avoiding value judgments encoded in thick concepts when these concepts are used in economic theories. We focus on what implications this might have for the tenability of the fact/value dichotomy in economics. Thick concepts have an evaluative and a descriptive component. Our suggestion is that despite attempts to rid thick concepts of their evaluative component, economists are often not successful. We focus on the strategy of explication to remove the evaluative component of thick concepts and argue that often economists either have to make value judgments or are unable to individuate out the phenomenon under analysis. We support our claim with a case study, namely the concept of addiction in Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy’s Theory of Rational Addiction (1988). One consequence of our analysis is that theories containing thick concepts could commit the economists to making value judgments and as such undermine the fact/value dichotomy.
Djordjevic, C. 2021c. "What is Worldly Logic and Why Might it Lead to Suicide? Kierkegaard,
Wittgenstein, and The Critique of Logic" Kierkegaard Studies Year Book, Vol 10 (1): 459-487
In contemporary philosophy, there is a growing interest in how Søren Kierkegaard’s metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology may have influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein. This paper contributes to this discussion by arguing that each share and critique a particular conception of logic that I term “worldly logic.” Roughly, “worldly logic” contends logic and metaphysics are intimately interconnected. It further argues that reading Kierkegaard’s brief thoughts on logic, in the Climacus texts, through the lens of later Wittgenstein, helps clarify the nature of Kierkegaard’s critique. Finally, it argues that their shared abhorrence of a particular sort of philosophy of logic is principled and apt.
Wittgenstein, and The Critique of Logic" Kierkegaard Studies Year Book, Vol 10 (1): 459-487
In contemporary philosophy, there is a growing interest in how Søren Kierkegaard’s metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology may have influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein. This paper contributes to this discussion by arguing that each share and critique a particular conception of logic that I term “worldly logic.” Roughly, “worldly logic” contends logic and metaphysics are intimately interconnected. It further argues that reading Kierkegaard’s brief thoughts on logic, in the Climacus texts, through the lens of later Wittgenstein, helps clarify the nature of Kierkegaard’s critique. Finally, it argues that their shared abhorrence of a particular sort of philosophy of logic is principled and apt.
Djordjevic, C. 2021d. "Making Things Difficult: Work on/and Soul-craft" in P. Nehra
(Ed.) Loneliness and the Crisis of Work. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Often, work in the contemporary world is cast as inherently exploitative, and so antithetical to social justice. Though it is undeniable that many forms of work are rightly criticized on these grounds, I explore a radically different form of work. Specifically, I discuss a form of work that purposefully imposes hardship on people. I argue that this form of work is actually a constitutive condition for forming a particular sort of community. Based on this, I then criticize the idea that hard work is some sort of anathema to the human condition. Indeed, as we shall see, one way to avoid anomie may well be this sort of work.
(Ed.) Loneliness and the Crisis of Work. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Often, work in the contemporary world is cast as inherently exploitative, and so antithetical to social justice. Though it is undeniable that many forms of work are rightly criticized on these grounds, I explore a radically different form of work. Specifically, I discuss a form of work that purposefully imposes hardship on people. I argue that this form of work is actually a constitutive condition for forming a particular sort of community. Based on this, I then criticize the idea that hard work is some sort of anathema to the human condition. Indeed, as we shall see, one way to avoid anomie may well be this sort of work.
Djordjevic, C. 2021e. "Getting Emotional: Wittgenstein, van Fraassen, and Making Sense of
Revolutions" Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science: Special Issue–
Wittgenstein and the Sciences; History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education Vol 10: 1-
17
This paper aims to demonstrate the fecundity of pairing specific insights from On Certainty with research in the philosophy and history of the natural sciences. To do so, it discusses one set of related themes in the work that focus on the possibility of and nature of revolutionary change. Specifically, I argue that several of Wittgenstein’s rather gnomic remarks presage van Fraassen’s insistence on the need for decisions and emotions throughout scientific revolutions. Moreover, I argue that reading both together enriches each’s individual account and helps further make sense of why and how conversion is not just a ‘mad leap in the dark’.
Revolutions" Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science: Special Issue–
Wittgenstein and the Sciences; History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education Vol 10: 1-
17
This paper aims to demonstrate the fecundity of pairing specific insights from On Certainty with research in the philosophy and history of the natural sciences. To do so, it discusses one set of related themes in the work that focus on the possibility of and nature of revolutionary change. Specifically, I argue that several of Wittgenstein’s rather gnomic remarks presage van Fraassen’s insistence on the need for decisions and emotions throughout scientific revolutions. Moreover, I argue that reading both together enriches each’s individual account and helps further make sense of why and how conversion is not just a ‘mad leap in the dark’.
Djordjevic, C. 2021f. "Play, Language, and Understanding" in E. Ryall, W. Russell & M. MacLean
(Eds.) Philosophies of Play as Praxis: Volume 4 of Philosophers at Play. London, UK: Routledge
Press.
This paper argues that the concept of play should play a far more important role in contemporary semantics. Specifically, I argue that aspects of language understanding and context can be made sense of by deploying the concept of play. To sustain this, I draw from later Wittgenstein, Cavell, Mulhall, and Travis, as well as from Huizinga's neglected analysis of play as a key category.
(Eds.) Philosophies of Play as Praxis: Volume 4 of Philosophers at Play. London, UK: Routledge
Press.
This paper argues that the concept of play should play a far more important role in contemporary semantics. Specifically, I argue that aspects of language understanding and context can be made sense of by deploying the concept of play. To sustain this, I draw from later Wittgenstein, Cavell, Mulhall, and Travis, as well as from Huizinga's neglected analysis of play as a key category.
"Djordjevic, C. 2020. "When Clarity Conflicts with Empirical Adequacy:
Conceptual Engineering, Anthropology, and Evans-Pritchard’s Ethnography"
Synthese.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02666-4
This paper critically examines a form of conceptual engineering, which I term "normative engineering," and its possible application to anthropology. It argues not only that normative engineering fails, but also that it vitiates naturalism in the name of a priori ideals. Finally, it briefly explores some implications.
Conceptual Engineering, Anthropology, and Evans-Pritchard’s Ethnography"
Synthese.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02666-4
This paper critically examines a form of conceptual engineering, which I term "normative engineering," and its possible application to anthropology. It argues not only that normative engineering fails, but also that it vitiates naturalism in the name of a priori ideals. Finally, it briefly explores some implications.
Djordjevic, C. 2020. "“Where Are Our Words?: A Mythic Reply to Cavell’s Mythology”
Conversations: The Journal of Cavell Studies. Vol 8: 51-91
This essay aims to reply to Cavell and his mythological understanding of both later Wittgenstein and philosophical therapy. In section one, I discuss what a "philosophical response" is. In section two, I consider both what a "myth" or "symbolic expression" might be as well as how such mythic response can be philosophical. In section three, I link Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein to Kierkegaard's mythological knight of resignation. In section four, I offer my own interpretation of Wittgenstein based on Kierkegaard's knight of faith. Finally, in section five, I briefly discuss the implications that such a reading has for "therapy.
Conversations: The Journal of Cavell Studies. Vol 8: 51-91
This essay aims to reply to Cavell and his mythological understanding of both later Wittgenstein and philosophical therapy. In section one, I discuss what a "philosophical response" is. In section two, I consider both what a "myth" or "symbolic expression" might be as well as how such mythic response can be philosophical. In section three, I link Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein to Kierkegaard's mythological knight of resignation. In section four, I offer my own interpretation of Wittgenstein based on Kierkegaard's knight of faith. Finally, in section five, I briefly discuss the implications that such a reading has for "therapy.
Djordjevic, C. 2020. "Complexity, Power Laws and a Humean Argument in Risk Management: The
Fundamental Inadequacy of Probability Theory as a Foundation for Modeling Complex Risk in
Banking" (with C. Hoffman)
Homo Oeconomicus. Vol: To Be Determined.
In this article, my co-author and I argue that Hume's skeptical argument against induction, far from being 'merely academic,' raise substantial issues when one attempts to apply probability to organized complex systems in risk management. We further contend that Hume's argument may require a radical rethinking of if, how, where, and when to apply probabilistic tools to risk management.
Fundamental Inadequacy of Probability Theory as a Foundation for Modeling Complex Risk in
Banking" (with C. Hoffman)
Homo Oeconomicus. Vol: To Be Determined.
In this article, my co-author and I argue that Hume's skeptical argument against induction, far from being 'merely academic,' raise substantial issues when one attempts to apply probability to organized complex systems in risk management. We further contend that Hume's argument may require a radical rethinking of if, how, where, and when to apply probabilistic tools to risk management.
Djordjevic, C. 2020. "The Politics in/of Pain"
Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol: To Be Determined (Available Online at:
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0191453720912291)
This paper argues that much political philosophy is underwritten by a normative conception of the nature of pain. It further argues that this conception conflicts with both empirical and conceptual evidence. Given this, it contends that we must substantially modify our understanding of politics in light of a better conception of pain.
Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol: To Be Determined (Available Online at:
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0191453720912291)
This paper argues that much political philosophy is underwritten by a normative conception of the nature of pain. It further argues that this conception conflicts with both empirical and conceptual evidence. Given this, it contends that we must substantially modify our understanding of politics in light of a better conception of pain.
Djordjevic, C. 2019. "Who Guards the Guardians? Kant, Hamann, and the Violence of Public
Reasoners" Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence Vol 3 (2): 14-34
This paper examine Hamann's response to Kant's famed essay 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' I argue that threads of Hamann's argument are principled and powerful objections to Kant's conception of the Enlightenment project. I further link Hamann's criticism to contemporary post-colonial attacks on the very idea of an 'enlightenment.'
Reasoners" Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence Vol 3 (2): 14-34
This paper examine Hamann's response to Kant's famed essay 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' I argue that threads of Hamann's argument are principled and powerful objections to Kant's conception of the Enlightenment project. I further link Hamann's criticism to contemporary post-colonial attacks on the very idea of an 'enlightenment.'
Djordjevic, C. 2019. "What is Antiphilosophy?" Metaphilosophy. Vol. 50 (1-2): 16-35.
This paper aims to address three interrelated questions- is antiphilosophy a possible metaphilosophical position? If it is, what characterizes it? And what ramifications would it have? I argue that antiphilosophy is possible and is best construed as an attempt to reconstruct philosophical discourse along non-cognitive lines. Explicitly, "to assert" and the belief propositional-attitude is replaced by "to convince" and a pro-attitude desire to rhetorically talk someone into something. I examine one possible form such a position could take as well as various ramifications of it.
This paper aims to address three interrelated questions- is antiphilosophy a possible metaphilosophical position? If it is, what characterizes it? And what ramifications would it have? I argue that antiphilosophy is possible and is best construed as an attempt to reconstruct philosophical discourse along non-cognitive lines. Explicitly, "to assert" and the belief propositional-attitude is replaced by "to convince" and a pro-attitude desire to rhetorically talk someone into something. I examine one possible form such a position could take as well as various ramifications of it.
Djordjevic, C. 2018. "(How) Does Finnegans Wake Mean Something?" In P. Stalmaszczyk (Ed.) Objects of
Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Warsaw, PL: Peter Lang.
This paper examines one of the most 'abnormal' cases of language- Joyce's masterful Finnegans Wake. I argue that the book is meaningful. I then attempt to apply to popular semantic theories to it and argue that both fail to explain how the book is meaningful. Finally, I turn to Davidson and Derrida's consideration of the work and argue that their accounts open new avenues for semantic inquiry.
Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Warsaw, PL: Peter Lang.
This paper examines one of the most 'abnormal' cases of language- Joyce's masterful Finnegans Wake. I argue that the book is meaningful. I then attempt to apply to popular semantic theories to it and argue that both fail to explain how the book is meaningful. Finally, I turn to Davidson and Derrida's consideration of the work and argue that their accounts open new avenues for semantic inquiry.
Djordjevic, C. 2018. "Confusion, Irrationality, and the Ends of Philosophy: Horwich's Wittgenstein-Inspired
Metaphilosophy" Philosophical Investigations. Vol 41. (3): 329-365.
This paper examines Horwich's interpretation of later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical thought. I argue that Horwich's account demonstrates why the attempt to make philosophy into a scientific research program is doomed to failure. However, I argue that this otherwise insightful interpretation is vitiated by an inflated concept of rationality. I then show that we can reject this concept of rationality, on Horwich's own grounds. Finally, I discuss how such a globally deflationary stance aligns with Socratic philosophy.
Metaphilosophy" Philosophical Investigations. Vol 41. (3): 329-365.
This paper examines Horwich's interpretation of later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical thought. I argue that Horwich's account demonstrates why the attempt to make philosophy into a scientific research program is doomed to failure. However, I argue that this otherwise insightful interpretation is vitiated by an inflated concept of rationality. I then show that we can reject this concept of rationality, on Horwich's own grounds. Finally, I discuss how such a globally deflationary stance aligns with Socratic philosophy.
Djordjevic, C. & Nikorelos, V. 2013. "'I Want to Drink Paint.' A Rationalized Account of Desire" Rerum
Causae. Vol 4. (1): 52-65.
This paper examines Davidson's theory of action in light of psychoanalysis. Specifically, we focus on what pro-attitudes are, how they function, and how psychoanalysis might provide tools for further explicating Davidson's account of intentionality.
Causae. Vol 4. (1): 52-65.
This paper examines Davidson's theory of action in light of psychoanalysis. Specifically, we focus on what pro-attitudes are, how they function, and how psychoanalysis might provide tools for further explicating Davidson's account of intentionality.
Djordjevic, C. 2013. "Comments on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" Justitia Omnibus. Vol E.
(1): 1-5.
This paper reflects on the philosophical justifications for universality that underpin the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Specifically, it examines several popular anthropological criticisms of the Declaration and argues that, for various reasons, each fails to undermine the claim. However, it also points out that these criticisms can play the role of reminders that should help us avoid over-hasty generalisations.
(1): 1-5.
This paper reflects on the philosophical justifications for universality that underpin the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Specifically, it examines several popular anthropological criticisms of the Declaration and argues that, for various reasons, each fails to undermine the claim. However, it also points out that these criticisms can play the role of reminders that should help us avoid over-hasty generalisations.