Presentations
"The Danger of 'Best Practices': Against Theory in Biomedicine"
Presented at: Anti-Theory in Philosophy of Science and Ethics
Ben-Gurion University, Be'er Sheva, Israel
July, 2023
This talk critically examines some of the adverse effects of evidence-based medicine (EBM). Specifically, it argues that for the problem of pain, EBM's epistemic theory of evidence goes badly wrong. It also makes some suggestions about how better to accommodate the testimony of patients and clinical experience when trying to assess, understand, and treat the pain of others.
Presented at: Anti-Theory in Philosophy of Science and Ethics
Ben-Gurion University, Be'er Sheva, Israel
July, 2023
This talk critically examines some of the adverse effects of evidence-based medicine (EBM). Specifically, it argues that for the problem of pain, EBM's epistemic theory of evidence goes badly wrong. It also makes some suggestions about how better to accommodate the testimony of patients and clinical experience when trying to assess, understand, and treat the pain of others.
"Addiction as A Thick Term: Explication, Normativity, and Positive Economics" (with Prof. Catherine Herfeld)
Presented at: European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Université Toulouse-Jean Jaurès, Toulouse, France
September 2020
This talk explores Gary Becker et al.'s attempt to explicate "addiction" so that it can be incorporated into positive economics. Specifically, it focuses on the attempt to remove the normative aspects from "addition" via explication. It argues that such an attempt is problematic. It further discusses what this failure might teach us about the normative/factual dichotomy.
Presented at: European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Université Toulouse-Jean Jaurès, Toulouse, France
September 2020
This talk explores Gary Becker et al.'s attempt to explicate "addiction" so that it can be incorporated into positive economics. Specifically, it focuses on the attempt to remove the normative aspects from "addition" via explication. It argues that such an attempt is problematic. It further discusses what this failure might teach us about the normative/factual dichotomy.
"Addiction as A Thick Term: Explication, Normativity, and Positive Economics" (with Prof. Catherine Herfeld)
Presented at: International Conference for Economic Method.
University of Helsinki, Finland
August 2018.
This talk explores Gary Becker et al.'s attempt to explicate "addiction" so that it can be incorporated into positive economics. Specifically, it focuses on the attempt to remove the normative aspects from "addition" via explication. It argues that such an attempt is problematic. It further discusses what this failure might teach us about the normative/factual dichotomy.
Presented at: International Conference for Economic Method.
University of Helsinki, Finland
August 2018.
This talk explores Gary Becker et al.'s attempt to explicate "addiction" so that it can be incorporated into positive economics. Specifically, it focuses on the attempt to remove the normative aspects from "addition" via explication. It argues that such an attempt is problematic. It further discusses what this failure might teach us about the normative/factual dichotomy.
"Fragmented Cultures and Artefacts of Representation? The Culture Concept and Its Problems"
Presented at: Philosophy, Politics, Anthropology and Allied Disciplines
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
May, 2019.
This talk explores the concept of culture in early anthropology, recent criticisms of it by anthropologists, and how one might meet these criticisms while maintaining the pragmatic usefulness of the culture concept. Specifically, I argue that a nuanced account of "representation" can assimilate important features of these criticisms while maintaining a role for the concept of culture.
Presented at: Philosophy, Politics, Anthropology and Allied Disciplines
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
May, 2019.
This talk explores the concept of culture in early anthropology, recent criticisms of it by anthropologists, and how one might meet these criticisms while maintaining the pragmatic usefulness of the culture concept. Specifically, I argue that a nuanced account of "representation" can assimilate important features of these criticisms while maintaining a role for the concept of culture.
"The Politics of/in Pain"
Presented At: Seventh Annual St. Andrews International Political Theory Graduate Conference.
School of International Relations, St. Andrews, Scotland.
May 2019.
This talk discusses the normative underpinnings of how contemporary political theory understandings pain, pain talk, and pain ascription. It follows later Wittgenstein as well as several post-colonial thinkers to argue that our 'common sense' view of pain is inherently problematic. It further argues that a different account of the nature of pain changes many supposedly obvious political ideals.
Presented At: Seventh Annual St. Andrews International Political Theory Graduate Conference.
School of International Relations, St. Andrews, Scotland.
May 2019.
This talk discusses the normative underpinnings of how contemporary political theory understandings pain, pain talk, and pain ascription. It follows later Wittgenstein as well as several post-colonial thinkers to argue that our 'common sense' view of pain is inherently problematic. It further argues that a different account of the nature of pain changes many supposedly obvious political ideals.
"Doing 'Meaning is Use' Right: Hacking, History, and the Legacy of Later Wittgenstein"
Presented at: The Philosophy of Ian Hacking Conference.
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary.
April 2019.
This talk examines many of Hacking's scattered remarks on how later Wittgenstein and Foucault can be read together. I develop these threads and offer a refinement of the 'standard' view of grammar in terms of Foucault's genealogical analysis. I further argue that such a reading mitigates or circumvents many problems that beset Wittgenstein scholarships.
Presented at: The Philosophy of Ian Hacking Conference.
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary.
April 2019.
This talk examines many of Hacking's scattered remarks on how later Wittgenstein and Foucault can be read together. I develop these threads and offer a refinement of the 'standard' view of grammar in terms of Foucault's genealogical analysis. I further argue that such a reading mitigates or circumvents many problems that beset Wittgenstein scholarships.
"Conceptual Engineering: Imperialism with an Analytic Face"
Presented at: Conceptual Analysis in Practical Philosophy Conference.
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
December 2018.
This talk argues that conceptual engineering, in its political form, quickly deteriorates into a form of intellectual-cum-political imperialism. To make this case, I examine ameliorative analysis a la Haslanger against the backdrop of post-colonial theorists like G. Spivak and T. Asad. I argue that the latter both show that ameliorative analysis is imperialistic as well as why such an imperialism is deeply problematic for the goal of fostering social justice.
Presented at: Conceptual Analysis in Practical Philosophy Conference.
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
December 2018.
This talk argues that conceptual engineering, in its political form, quickly deteriorates into a form of intellectual-cum-political imperialism. To make this case, I examine ameliorative analysis a la Haslanger against the backdrop of post-colonial theorists like G. Spivak and T. Asad. I argue that the latter both show that ameliorative analysis is imperialistic as well as why such an imperialism is deeply problematic for the goal of fostering social justice.
"Conversion and Rationality: Wittgenstein, van Fraassen, and the Need for Decision"
Presented at: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology Workshop.
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
November 2018.
This talk examines Wittgenstein's On Certainty in conjunction with van Fraassen's volunteerism epistemology. It argues that both philosophers zero-in on a specific sub-type of belief that does, in fact, require a decision. It then connects this realisation with questions concerning conversion, rationality, community, and truth. It closes by discussing why both thinkers emphasise the role of responsibility as a critical, and critically neglected, aspect of our epistemic life.
Presented at: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology Workshop.
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
November 2018.
This talk examines Wittgenstein's On Certainty in conjunction with van Fraassen's volunteerism epistemology. It argues that both philosophers zero-in on a specific sub-type of belief that does, in fact, require a decision. It then connects this realisation with questions concerning conversion, rationality, community, and truth. It closes by discussing why both thinkers emphasise the role of responsibility as a critical, and critically neglected, aspect of our epistemic life.
"Addiction as A Thick Term: Explication, Normativity, and Positive Economics" (with Prof. Catherine Herfeld)
Presented at: Concept Formation and Transference Conference.
University of Zurich, Switzerland.
October 2018.
This talk explores Gary Becker et al.'s attempt to explicate "addiction" so that it can be incorporated into positive economics. Specifically, it focuses on the attempt to remove the normative aspects from "addition" via explication. It argues that such an attempt is problematic. It further discusses what this failure might teach us about the normative/factual dichotomy.
Presented at: Concept Formation and Transference Conference.
University of Zurich, Switzerland.
October 2018.
This talk explores Gary Becker et al.'s attempt to explicate "addiction" so that it can be incorporated into positive economics. Specifically, it focuses on the attempt to remove the normative aspects from "addition" via explication. It argues that such an attempt is problematic. It further discusses what this failure might teach us about the normative/factual dichotomy.
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"Addiction as A Thick Term: Explication, Normativity, and Positive Economics"
Presented at: Science as a FACTory? Conference.
The University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.
October 2018.
This talk explores Gary Becker et al.'s attempt to explicate "addiction" so that it can be incorporated into positive economics. Specifically, it focuses on the attempt to remove the normative aspects from "addition" via explication. It argues that such an attempt is problematic. It further discusses what this failure might teach us about the normative/factual dichotomy.
Presented at: Science as a FACTory? Conference.
The University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.
October 2018.
This talk explores Gary Becker et al.'s attempt to explicate "addiction" so that it can be incorporated into positive economics. Specifically, it focuses on the attempt to remove the normative aspects from "addition" via explication. It argues that such an attempt is problematic. It further discusses what this failure might teach us about the normative/factual dichotomy.
"Back to the Rough Ground!: Wittgenstein and Critical Openness"
Presented at: International Conference of Philosophers of Education.
University of Haifa, Israel.
August 2018.
This talk discusses a philosophy of education based on the works of later Wittgenstein as interpreted by, e.g., Cavell and Mulhall. Specifically, it proffers a new conception of education that can mitigate cultural clashes by a systematic process of negotiated understanding wherein the educator and the student each play a constructive role. It further argues against idealised "learner-centric" theories where a teacher refuses to hold a student accountable for, e.g., factual errors, as well as a dogmatic and doctrinaire form of "education" where a student is merely trained to recite dead facts at the teacher's command.
Presented at: International Conference of Philosophers of Education.
University of Haifa, Israel.
August 2018.
This talk discusses a philosophy of education based on the works of later Wittgenstein as interpreted by, e.g., Cavell and Mulhall. Specifically, it proffers a new conception of education that can mitigate cultural clashes by a systematic process of negotiated understanding wherein the educator and the student each play a constructive role. It further argues against idealised "learner-centric" theories where a teacher refuses to hold a student accountable for, e.g., factual errors, as well as a dogmatic and doctrinaire form of "education" where a student is merely trained to recite dead facts at the teacher's command.
"Anything but Ordinary: Wittgenstein and the Very Idea of Standard Use"
Presented at: What's Wrong (And What's Right) with Ordinary Language Philosophy Conference.
University of Turku, Finland.
May 2017.
This talk discusses later Wittgenstein and his (supposed) similarities to philosophers like Austin and Ryle. It argues for a sharp distinction between them based on later Wittgenstein's unordinary examples, bizarre language-games, and so on, as well as his eschewing of "analytic" definitions as found in dictionaries. It further argues that, for later Wittgenstein, a "standard" or "stuck" use is not something we know based on "intuition," some tacit grasp of our native language, or because the Oxford Dictionary says the word means something. Rather, if one wishes to speak of "stock" uses, these are truisms that are arrived at after painstaking philosophical investigations of the myriad practices that our words interpolate with.
Presented at: What's Wrong (And What's Right) with Ordinary Language Philosophy Conference.
University of Turku, Finland.
May 2017.
This talk discusses later Wittgenstein and his (supposed) similarities to philosophers like Austin and Ryle. It argues for a sharp distinction between them based on later Wittgenstein's unordinary examples, bizarre language-games, and so on, as well as his eschewing of "analytic" definitions as found in dictionaries. It further argues that, for later Wittgenstein, a "standard" or "stuck" use is not something we know based on "intuition," some tacit grasp of our native language, or because the Oxford Dictionary says the word means something. Rather, if one wishes to speak of "stock" uses, these are truisms that are arrived at after painstaking philosophical investigations of the myriad practices that our words interpolate with.
"(How) Does Finnegans Wake Mean Something?"
Presented at: Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics.
University of Lodz, Lodz, Poland.
May 2017
This talk reflects on James Joyce's masterful "night book," Finnegans Wake. It does so to show how a typical focus on more "standard" or "non-problematic" examples commonly found in linguistics and the philosophy of language, e.g., "the man with the martini glass is a famous linguist" may occlude or elide features of semantics that only manifest themselves in highly deviant cases. It closes by discussing Davidson and Derrida's reading of Joyce and argues for an interesting similarity in their response to one of the most bizarre works ever produced in English.
Presented at: Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics.
University of Lodz, Lodz, Poland.
May 2017
This talk reflects on James Joyce's masterful "night book," Finnegans Wake. It does so to show how a typical focus on more "standard" or "non-problematic" examples commonly found in linguistics and the philosophy of language, e.g., "the man with the martini glass is a famous linguist" may occlude or elide features of semantics that only manifest themselves in highly deviant cases. It closes by discussing Davidson and Derrida's reading of Joyce and argues for an interesting similarity in their response to one of the most bizarre works ever produced in English.
"Play, Language, and Understanding: A Hopefully Playful Presentation"
Presented at: Philosophers at Play.
University of Gloucestershire, Gloucestershire, UK.
April 2017.
This talk discusses the use of play (and playfulness) in understanding, read as grasping semantic content. Specifically, it argues that a critical aspect of coming to properly grasp the semantic content of someone's utterances depends in part on context, as Travis would have it. However, it further argues that we cannot allow "context" to function as an unexplained explainer and that, rather, we should see it as a negotiated formation that is established and maintained by a certain playfulness. It closes by reflecting on this playfulness as an essential part of what we do with our words.
Presented at: Philosophers at Play.
University of Gloucestershire, Gloucestershire, UK.
April 2017.
This talk discusses the use of play (and playfulness) in understanding, read as grasping semantic content. Specifically, it argues that a critical aspect of coming to properly grasp the semantic content of someone's utterances depends in part on context, as Travis would have it. However, it further argues that we cannot allow "context" to function as an unexplained explainer and that, rather, we should see it as a negotiated formation that is established and maintained by a certain playfulness. It closes by reflecting on this playfulness as an essential part of what we do with our words.
"Against Theory or a Plea for Anarchism"
Presented at: Wittgenstein, Horwich, and the Legacy of Truth Conference.
University of Zurich, Switzerland.
June 2016.
This talk examines Horwich's deflationary interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. It argues that Horwich's reading is powerful and principled. However, it maintains that Horwich's reading, though a fine deed, is half done. Specifically, it proffers a different positive account of philosophy, and philosophical methodology, after we have deflated attempts at theorisation and metaphysics in philosophy.
Presented at: Wittgenstein, Horwich, and the Legacy of Truth Conference.
University of Zurich, Switzerland.
June 2016.
This talk examines Horwich's deflationary interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. It argues that Horwich's reading is powerful and principled. However, it maintains that Horwich's reading, though a fine deed, is half done. Specifically, it proffers a different positive account of philosophy, and philosophical methodology, after we have deflated attempts at theorisation and metaphysics in philosophy.
"History or Genealogy: The Question of Methodology in Historical Reading and Reading Historically"
Presented at: Symposium on Frazer MacBride's 'The Genealogy of Universals.'
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
April 2016.
This talk engages with MacBride's exciting book- The Genealogy of Universals. Though broadly sympathetic to the book's themes and implications, it argues that MacBride mischaracterises his methodology. Specifically, it argues that the book is best viewed as a careful version of critical historiography rather than a proper genealogy. This is partly because MacBride still has a latent teleology and tacitly accepts as a given certain set of historically contingent categories, like "analytic," or, more particularly, "philosophy." It further stresses that, in point of fact, a proper genealogy would both attempt to problematise these supposedly "given" categories as well as stressing the fact that history is, simply, "one damn thing after another" rather than some progressive unfolding of reason/logic/etc.
Presented at: Symposium on Frazer MacBride's 'The Genealogy of Universals.'
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
April 2016.
This talk engages with MacBride's exciting book- The Genealogy of Universals. Though broadly sympathetic to the book's themes and implications, it argues that MacBride mischaracterises his methodology. Specifically, it argues that the book is best viewed as a careful version of critical historiography rather than a proper genealogy. This is partly because MacBride still has a latent teleology and tacitly accepts as a given certain set of historically contingent categories, like "analytic," or, more particularly, "philosophy." It further stresses that, in point of fact, a proper genealogy would both attempt to problematise these supposedly "given" categories as well as stressing the fact that history is, simply, "one damn thing after another" rather than some progressive unfolding of reason/logic/etc.
"Observations on Hegel's Observing Reasons"
Presented at: Hegel, Analytic Philosophy, and Formal Logic Conference.
Indiana University-Purdue University, US.
October 2014.
This talk reflects on the section in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit that focuses on Newtonian physics- Observing Reason. It puts forward a reading that casts Hegel as a sophisticated precursor to, e.g., Pierre Duhem and B.C. van Fraassen's anti-realist account of physical laws. It also reflects on Hegel's conception of "causation" and argues that he rejects Hume's strictures and embraces a far more Nancy Cartwright-esque account of powers and capacity.
Presented at: Hegel, Analytic Philosophy, and Formal Logic Conference.
Indiana University-Purdue University, US.
October 2014.
This talk reflects on the section in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit that focuses on Newtonian physics- Observing Reason. It puts forward a reading that casts Hegel as a sophisticated precursor to, e.g., Pierre Duhem and B.C. van Fraassen's anti-realist account of physical laws. It also reflects on Hegel's conception of "causation" and argues that he rejects Hume's strictures and embraces a far more Nancy Cartwright-esque account of powers and capacity.
"On the Nature of Exchange" (With Kamila Buchter)
Presented at: Rethinking Economics Conference.
The New School & Columbia Law School, New York, US.
September 2014.
This talk, co-presented with Kamila Buchter, focuses on the intersection between anthropology of economics and neoclassical economics. Specifically, it explores the nature of "exchange." It argues that anthropological evidence should make us wary of taking "exchange" as a "natural" or "given" category. It further discusses how different cultural variations concerning "exchange" might affect how economics might (or might not) apply to non-Western groups.
Presented at: Rethinking Economics Conference.
The New School & Columbia Law School, New York, US.
September 2014.
This talk, co-presented with Kamila Buchter, focuses on the intersection between anthropology of economics and neoclassical economics. Specifically, it explores the nature of "exchange." It argues that anthropological evidence should make us wary of taking "exchange" as a "natural" or "given" category. It further discusses how different cultural variations concerning "exchange" might affect how economics might (or might not) apply to non-Western groups.
"William Faulkner and the Absent Present of G-d"
Presented at: Oxford University Twentieth-Century Literary Theory Working Group.
Oxford University, UK.
May 2013.
This presentation reflects on Faulkner's novel, A Light in August. Specifically, it focuses on the novel's ability to re-present absence as an integral part of the story. It reflects specifically on the latent theology, a negative theology I argue, that drives much of the work.
Presented at: Oxford University Twentieth-Century Literary Theory Working Group.
Oxford University, UK.
May 2013.
This presentation reflects on Faulkner's novel, A Light in August. Specifically, it focuses on the novel's ability to re-present absence as an integral part of the story. It reflects specifically on the latent theology, a negative theology I argue, that drives much of the work.
"'I want to Drink Paint' a Rationalised Account of Desire" (with Vasilos Nikorelos)
Presented at: LSE-Bayreuth Student Philosophy Conference.
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK.
April 2013.
This talk, co-presented with Vasilos Nikorelos, examines Davidson's account of intentional action and agentive causation. Specifically, it focuses on "desire" and Davidson's rather interesting turning to Freud at several points to clarify it. Taking up this thread, it argues that Freudian psychology provides one way of further articulating what a pro-attitude is, how it functions, how it can be linked the propositional-attitudes, and so on.
Presented at: LSE-Bayreuth Student Philosophy Conference.
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK.
April 2013.
This talk, co-presented with Vasilos Nikorelos, examines Davidson's account of intentional action and agentive causation. Specifically, it focuses on "desire" and Davidson's rather interesting turning to Freud at several points to clarify it. Taking up this thread, it argues that Freudian psychology provides one way of further articulating what a pro-attitude is, how it functions, how it can be linked the propositional-attitudes, and so on.